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315 
Possible Reforms of the U.S. Immigration 
Laws 
Kevin R. Johnson* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1952, Congress passed the comprehensive federal 
immigration statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA).1 The law has been amended almost annually since its 
original enactment, sometimes in minor ways and other times 
with major overhauls.  
The last decade has seen a series of calls for immigration 
reform in the United States. Many reform bills have been 
debated in Congress and among the public at large.2 To this 
point, efforts to pass significant—referred to by many observers 
as “comprehensive”—immigration reform have failed.3  
The politics of immigration are complex, with public debate 
of the issue often heated. Positions on immigration are not neatly 
divided along Republican and Democratic party lines. For 
example, labor unions, generally considered to be liberal 
politically, at times have supported immigration restrictions in 
hopes of protecting domestic workers, while The Wall Street 
Journal, known for its conservatism, has championed easy 
admission of labor. 
 
 * Dean and Mabie-Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, 
University of California at Davis School of Law; A.B., University of California, Berkeley; 
J.D., Harvard University. I am one of the contributors to the ImmigrationProf blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/, and the regular immigration contributor 
to SCOTUSblog, www.scotusblog.com. Parts of this Article are adapted from parts of 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 18 of the forthcoming second edition of UNDERSTANDING 
IMMIGRATION LAW (2d ed., forthcoming 2015). 
 1 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of Titles 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.). 
 2 See infra Part II. 
 3 For different perspectives on comprehensive immigration reform, see Steven W. 
Bender, Compassionate Immigration Reform, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 107 (2010); Sheila 
Jackson Lee, Why Immigration Reform Requires a Comprehensive Approach that Includes 
Both Legalization Programs and Provisions to Secure the Border, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
267 (2006); Christopher J. Walker, Border Vigilantism and Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 135 (2007); see also John D. Skrentny & Micah 
Gell-Redman, Comprehensive Immigration Reform and the Dynamics of Statutory 
Entrenchment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 325 (2011) (explaining the failure of Congress to 
enact comprehensive immigration reform during the Bush and Obama administrations). 
Do Not Delete 2/13/2015 9:50 PM 
316 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:2 
One complicating factor for immigration reform is that the 
events of September 11, 2001 have influenced the immigration 
debate. Even after more than a decade, any reform proposal that 
does not focus on border enforcement and enhanced removal 
efforts continues to risk claims that it poses undue risks to the 
national security and public safety.4 
Part I of this Article first outlines the impacts of the 
contemporary operation of the U.S. immigration laws and some 
of the problems with the current immigration system. Part II 
describes various reform proposals floated in Congress in the last 
few years. Part III generally outlines some more far-reaching 
possibilities for immigration reform. 
I. THE IMMIGRATION STATUS QUO 
To appropriately evaluate potential immigration reforms, 
one must consider the operation of modern U.S. immigration law 
and policy and its impacts. 
A.  Undocumented Immigration 
As President George W. Bush observed in calling for 
immigration reform in 2006, “illegal immigrants live in the 
shadows of our society. . . . [T]he vast majority . . . are decent 
people who work hard, support their families, practice their faith, 
and lead responsible lives. They are part of American life, but 
they are beyond the reach and protection of American law.”5  
Somewhere in the neighborhood of 12 million undocumented 
immigrants currently live in the United States.6 Rather than 
 
 4 See BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 140–63 (2006); Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: 
Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 
(2007); see also Jonathan Hafetz, Immigration and National Security Law: Converging 
Approaches to State Power, Individual Rights, and Judicial Review, 46 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 
787 (2012) (discussing the relationship between immigration policy and national security 
after September 11, 2001); Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration 
in a Coordinated National Security Policy, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383 (2007) (analyzing 
how immigration law can serve national security ends); Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, 
Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
1173 (2004) (evaluating how post-September 11 terrorism concerns reshaped U.S. 
immigration law and policy). 
 5 George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform (May 15, 2006), in 
1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 928, 928–29 (2010) 
(emphasis added). 
 6 JEFFREY S. PASSEL, D’VERA COHN & ANA GONZALEZ-BARRERA, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., POPULATION DECLINE OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS STALLS, MAY HAVE REVERSED 
6 (2013), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2013/09/Unauthorized-Sept-2013-
FINAL.pdf, estimates that, as of March 2012, 11.7 million unauthorized immigrants lived 
in the United States. The U.S. government, whose estimates historically have been 
somewhat lower than those of non-governmental groups, estimated that, in 2011, 
11.5 million undocumented immigrants lived in the United States compared to 
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engaging in futile efforts to close the border, the United States 
would benefit if its immigration laws better addressed the 
modern political, economic, and social realities currently fueling 
undocumented immigration and attracting the millions of people 
who live and work in communities across the country in 
contravention of the U.S. immigration laws. 
Generations of migrants from Mexico have made their way to 
the United States.7 In modern times, migrants literally risk life 
and limb to come to this land of freedom and opportunity. Absent 
dramatic economic, political, and social changes, immigrants will 
continue to come lawfully and unlawfully to the United States in 
pursuit of employment and to reunite with family members. 
The limited legal avenues under U.S. law for labor migration 
encourage migration in violation of the law by noncitizens who 
seek to work in the country. Many unskilled and medium-skilled 
workers have no line to wait in to lawfully immigrate to the 
United States. 
Laws and policies promoting more liberal admissions would 
decrease the incentives for undocumented immigration. However, 
such policy proposals are often characterized as sacrificing 
national security by allowing too many immigrants into the 
United States. In response, commentators claim that flexible 
immigration admission systems would in fact better ensure 
national security.8 A scheme that better matches the demand for 
immigration—while minimizing the incentive for undocumented 
immigration and thus limiting the creation and maintenance of a 
population of millions of undocumented immigrants—arguably 
would better ensure public safety.9 To begin with, an 
immigration system that maximizes the likelihood that the U.S. 
government has the basic identifying information, such as name 
 
11.6 million in 2010. See MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN BAKER, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN 
THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2011, at 1 (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf. 
 7 See Gerald P. López, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just 
Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 641–72 (1981); JoAnne D. Spotts, 
U.S. Immigration Policy on the Southwest Border from Reagan Through Clinton, 
1981 − 2001, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601 (2002); see also Gerald P. López, Don’t We Like 
Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1711 (2012) (analyzing how the operation of the U.S. 
immigration laws has facilitated the creation of the undocumented immigrant population 
in the United States). 
 8 See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Misusing Immigration Policies in the Name of Homeland 
Security, 6 NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 195, 207–16 (2006); Jan Ting, Immigration Law 
Reform After 9/11: What Has Been and What Still Needs to Be Done, 17 TEMP. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 503, 512–15 (2003). 
 9 See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration 
Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 930–72. 
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and address, of as many immigrants in the United States as 
possible would improve criminal and immigration law 
enforcement and allow the nation to better protect national 
security. 
Recent years have seen increasingly aggressive efforts in the 
United States to close the southern border with Mexico. 
However, increased border enforcement efforts, to the surprise of 
many, have been accompanied by an increase in the overall size 
of the undocumented population. One study concluded that 
“[t]here is no evidence that the border enforcement 
build-up . . . has substantially reduced unauthorized border 
crossings,” and that “[d]espite large increases in spending and 
Border Patrol resources . . . the number of unauthorized 
immigrants . . . increased to levels higher than those” before 
1986.10 The bottom line is that the undocumented population in 
the United States has doubled since the mid-1990s.11  
The fact that so many undocumented immigrants live in the 
United States confirms what most Americans know—that the 
immigration laws are routinely violated and, as currently 
configured, are effectively unenforceable. The magnet of jobs 
unquestionably attracts many undocumented immigrants to the 
United States. Undocumented workers understand that if they 
are able to make the often-arduous journey to the United States, 
they can obtain work and that the job will pay more than most of 
them would have been able to earn in their native countries. 
Employers willingly hire undocumented workers. Day laborer 
pickup points in many American cities demonstrate both that 
undocumented immigrants can obtain work and employers are 
willing to hire them.12 
Employer sanctions, which bar the employment of 
undocumented immigrants, added to the immigration laws in 
1986 have failed to put an end to the employment of 
undocumented immigrants.13 Computer systems designed to 
 
 10 BELINDA I. REYES ET AL., HOLDING THE LINE? THE EFFECT OF THE RECENT BORDER 
BUILD-UP ON UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION, at viii, xii (2002) (emphasis added). 
 11 See PASSEL, COHN & GONZALEZ-BARRERA, supra note 6, at 6. 
 12 For studies of day laborers, see ABEL VALENZUELA, JR. ET AL., ON THE 
CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); ABEL VALENZUELA, JR. & EDWIN 
MELÉNDEZ, DAY LABOR IN NEW YORK: FINDINGS FROM THE NYDL SURVEY (2003); see also 
Justin McDevitt, Compromise Is Complicity: Why There Is No Middle Road in the 
Struggle to Protect Day Laborers in the United States, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 101 
(2010) (advocating increased protection of the rights of day laborers in the United States); 
Kim McLane Wardlaw, The Latino Immigration Experience, 31 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 
13, 30–35 (2012) (discussing the impacts of state and local regulation of day laborers on 
Mexican immigrants). 
 13 For critical analysis of the failure of employer sanctions to deter the employment 
of undocumented immigrants, see Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of 
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allow employers to easily verify work authorization, such as 
E-Verify, continue to have high error rates.14 
To this point, the addition of incremental enforcement 
measures has had a limited impact on undocumented 
immigration from Mexico.15 The U.S. government simply has 
been unable to keep migrants—who are so determined that they 
are willing to risk their lives—from unlawfully entering, and 
remaining in, the country.16 It makes little sense from an 
immigration or security standpoint to simply continue to throw 
resources at fortifying the borders, increasing border 
enforcement, and engaging in the futile attempt to keep all 
undocumented immigrants out of the country. 
The U.S. government has engaged in limited efforts to 
remove noncitizens who lawfully entered the country on 
temporary visas, such as students and tourists, but overstayed 
their terms. Visa overstays likely constitute somewhere between 
twenty-five and forty percent of the undocumented population.17 
Increased monitoring of nonimmigrant visa holders after 
September 11 does not appear to have had much of an impact on 
reducing visa overstays. Raids and increased interior 
enforcement pursued by the Bush administration also have not 
reduced the undocumented population in the United States.18  
 
Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343 
(1994); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The 
Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193. 
 14 See WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM EVALUATION 114 (2009), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E-
Verify%20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf; Emily Patten, Note, E-Verify During a Period of 
Economic Recovery and High Unemployment, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 475, 482–83; see also T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law, 
2007 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1313, 
1314 (2008) (acknowledging that the United States is years away from creating a 
computerized system that can reliably identify undocumented workers: “There is no clear 
way to fix employer sanctions anytime soon. The widely discussed ‘smart cards’ or ‘swipe 
cards’ will be years in the making. Meanwhile, massive work will need to be done on 
government databases to clean up misspelled, duplicate, and false names.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 15 See Belinda I. Reyes, The Impact of U.S. Immigration Policy on Mexican 
Unauthorized Immigration, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 131. 
 16 See generally PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 
(Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 2000) (analyzing the difficulties of border enforcement in 
reducing undocumented immigration while offering concrete benefits to politicians in 
pursuing border enforcement strategies). 
 17 See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 16 (2006), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf. 
 18 See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the 
Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1092–96 (2008) (discussing raids of 
meatpacking plants); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Immigration Law and Long-Term 
Residents: A Missing Chapter in American Criminal Law, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 645, 655 
(2008) (mentioning raids); Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications 
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Resistance to interior enforcement from employers, as well 
as immigrant rights advocates, makes such enforcement 
politically challenging.19 However, increased border enforcement 
without any effort to tighten the availability of jobs to 
undocumented immigrants will ultimately do little to change the 
status quo. The availability of jobs unquestionably will continue 
to fuel migration to this country. 
The current American immigration laws in many respects 
resemble the failed Prohibition-era anti-alcohol laws.20 In both 
instances, enforcement of the law failed dramatically and, to 
make matters worse, resulted in widespread negative collateral 
consequences, including widespread violation of the law, 
increased criminal activity, and diminished public perception of 
the legitimacy of the law. 
B.  Labor Exploitation 
The operation of the immigration laws has negative labor 
market consequences. Indeed, the large undocumented 
population harkens back to the days following the abolition of 
slavery in the United States, with a racial caste of workers 
relegated to a secondary labor market. As Professor Leticia 
Saucedo has written, the nation has seen the emergence of a 
“brown collar” workplace, with many Mexican migrants working 
in low-wage jobs.21 The new “Jim Crow” sees undocumented 
immigrants working for low wages in poor conditions—and 
virtually unprotected by law—in one labor market and all others 
in a superior, more law-abiding labor market.22  
 
of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137 (2008) (analyzing legal 
impacts of raids and other forms of interior immigration enforcement); Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, Under Arrest: Immigrants’ Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 853, 
862–88 (2008) (same); see also David B. Thronson, Creating Crisis: Immigration Raids 
and the Destabilization of Immigrant Families, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391 (2008) 
(identifying negative impacts of immigration raids on families). 
 19 See Lori Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of 
Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 359–61 (2001); 
Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 497, 516–21 (2004). 
 20 See Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 245–52 (2003). 
 21 See Leticia M. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation in the Brown Collar 
Workplace: Toward a Solution for the Inexorable 100%, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447 
(2008); Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting Workers 
in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303 (2004); Leticia M. 
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the 
Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006); see also Leticia M. Saucedo, Anglo 
Views of Mexican Labor: Shaping the Law of Temporary Work Through Masculinities 
Narratives, 13 NEV. L.J. 547 (2013) (analyzing narratives of race and masculinity used to 
justify the exploitation of Mexican immigrant workers). 
 22 See Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and 
Anti-immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163 (2010). 
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Other adverse consequences also are associated with the 
current immigration laws and their enforcement. Reports of 
involuntary servitude of immigrants in the modern United States 
have increased in recent years.23 More commonly, exploited in 
the workplace,24 undocumented workers have legal rights that go 
unenforced.25 Because many are people of color, the nation’s labor 
market has a distinctively racial caste quality to it. This labor 
market operates outside of the confines of law, with 
undocumented workers enjoying few legal protections and often 
working for low wages in poor conditions. More realistic 
immigration law and policy that allows labor migration could 
help eliminate this secondary labor market and halt the 
exploitation of undocumented workers (by making them less 
vulnerable because of their unauthorized immigration status). 
C.  Human Trafficking and Death on the Border 
Demand for evasion of the law by millions of undocumented 
immigrants has contributed to the emergence of highly organized 
human trafficking networks.26 In no small part due to tighter 
 
 
 23 See HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, FREEDOM DENIED: FORCED 
LABOR IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2005); Free the Slaves, Washington, D.C. & The Human Rights 
Ctr. of the Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, 23 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 47 (2005); Ellen L. Buckwalter, Maria Perinetti, Susan L. 
Pollet & Meredith S. Salvaggio, Modern Day Slavery in Our Own Backyard, 12 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 403 (2006). 
 24 See Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need: Undocumented Workers’ 
Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 607 (1993–1994); 
Donna E. Young, Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and Women’s Work, 2001 
UTAH L. REV. 1.  
 25 See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (holding 
that undocumented immigrant lacked full legal rights under federal labor law and was 
not entitled to reinstatement and back pay despite being unlawfully terminated for 
union-organizing activities). For critiques of the Hoffman Plastic decision, see, for 
example, Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal 
Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2003); Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103 (2003); 
Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the 
Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737 
(2003); María Pabón López, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United States 
Legal System After Hoffman Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and Comparison with 
Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301 (2005); Developments in the 
Law—Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2171, 2224–47 (2005); James Lin, Note, A 
Greedy Institution: Domestic Workers and a Legacy of Legislative Exclusion, 36 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 706 (2013). 
 26 See Morgan Brown, Targeting Demand: A New Approach to Curbing Human 
Trafficking in the United States, 11 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 357 (2012); Jennifer M. 
Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human 
Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977 (2006); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and 
Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 
157 (2007). 
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immigration enforcement, the trafficking of human beings today 
is a booming industry, with the problem extending across the 
entire United States. Deaths regularly occur as migrants attempt 
the dangerous crossing of the U.S./Mexico border.27 
Besides risking life and limb, some immigrants are forced to 
work to pay off smuggling debts, with thousands of immigrant 
women forced into the sex industry and other exploitative work 
arrangements.28 The trafficking of human beings—with its 
devastating impacts—flows directly from heightened 
immigration enforcement. Recognizing the problem, Congress 
has passed laws in response to human trafficking but has failed 
to more fundamentally reform the laws that in effect encourage 
the unlawful labor practice.29 
D.  A Disrespected Immigration Bureaucracy 
The American immigration bureaucracy frequently is 
accused of being unfair and biased. Many commentators and 
jurists currently express a lack of respect and confidence in the 
agencies that enforce the immigration laws. 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which 
until the spring of 2003 possessed primary responsibility for 
enforcing the immigration laws, had long been criticized as 
 
 27 For a sampling of extensive literature analyzing the deadly impacts of increased 
border enforcement measures, see TIMOTHY J. DUNN, THE MILITARIZATION OF THE 
U.S.−MEXICAN BORDER, 1978–1992: LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT DOCTRINE COMES HOME 
(Víctor J. Guerra et al. eds., 1996); KARL ESCHBACH, JACQUELINE HAGAN & NESTOR 
RODRIGUEZ, CAUSES AND TRENDS IN MIGRANT DEATHS ALONG THE U.S./MEXICO BORDER, 
1985–1998 (2001); JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER (2002); Wayne A. Cornelius, 
Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control 
Policy, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 661 (2001); Karl Eschbach et al., Death at the Border, 
33 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 430 (1999); Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation 
Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 121, 123 (2001); Guillermo Alonso Meneses, 
Human Rights and Undocumented Migration Along the Mexican-U.S. Border, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 267 (2003); Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican 
Workers, and International Human Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1 (2001). Much popular 
literature focuses on the travails of immigrants seeking to unlawfully enter the United 
States from Mexico. See, e.g., SONIA NAZARIO, ENRIQUE’S JOURNEY (2013); LUIS ALBERTO 
URREA, THE DEVIL’S HIGHWAY: A TRUE STORY (2004). 
 28 See Rosy Kandathil, Global Sex Trafficking and the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000: Legislative Responses to the Problem of Modern Slavery, 12 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 87 (2005); Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Sex Slavery in the United States and the 
Law Enacted to Stop It Here and Abroad, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 317 (2005); 
Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Domestic and International Impact of the U.S. Victims of 
Trafficking Protection Act of 2000: Does Law Deter Crime?, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 
193 (2005); see also Human Trafficking: Modern Enslavement of Immigrant Women in the 
United States, ACLU (May 31, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/human-traf 
ficking-modern-enslavement-immigrant-women-united-states. 
 29 See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 
1464, 1466 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2012)); Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875. 
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excessively focused on enforcement and being inefficient, 
arbitrary, and incompetent.30 The new Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) appears as enforcement-oriented as the old INS. 
This is not altogether surprising because the agency, as its name 
connotes, was created with the primary purpose of better 
protecting “homeland security,” not serving the needs of 
immigrants. Nor has the dismantling of the INS seen any 
dramatic improvement in the efficiency of immigration 
operations.31 Unless the DHS is reformed so that it better 
balances its enforcement and service functions, pouring 
increasing resources into the agency is unlikely to improve 
matters. For example, additional increases to funding to increase 
the number of Border Patrol officers without significantly 
providing sufficient training for them is likely to make matters 
worse, not better.32 
In addition, the decisions of the immigration courts and 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) have been the subject of 
sustained criticism.33 The Board has long been challenged for, 
among other things, a lack of independence and neutrality. Other 
criticisms run the gamut from poor quality rulings (most 
charitably attributed to a high volume of matters to review), to 
 
 30 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws 
and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1948–50 (2000); 
Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and 
Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1698–700 (1997).  
 31 For criticism of the Department of Homeland Security’s handling of immigration 
matters, see M. Isabel Medina, Immigrants and the Government’s War on Terrorism, 
6 NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 225, 230–32 (2006); Thomas W. Donovan, The American 
Immigration System: A Structural Change with a Different Emphasis, 17 INT’L. J. 
REFUGEE L. 574 (2005); Victor Romero, Race, Immigration, and the Department of 
Homeland Security, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 51, 52 (2004); Noël L. Griswold, 
Note, Forgetting the Melting Pot: An Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security 
Takeover of the INS, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 207, 227–28 (2005); Jeffrey Manns, 
Legislation Comment, Reorganization as a Substitute for Reform: The Abolition of the 
INS, 112 YALE L.J. 145 (2002). 
 32 See Ruchir Patel, Immigration Legislation Pursuant to Threats to US National 
Security, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 83, 97 (2003) (criticizing USA PATRIOT Act for 
increasing the number of Border Patrol agents but failing to ensure better training); 
Gabriela A. Gallegos, Comment, Border Matters: Redefining the National Interest in 
U.S.-Mexico Immigration and Trade Policy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1729, 1757–58 (2004) 
(stating that 1996 immigration reforms failed to ensure adequate training in light of “the 
Border Patrol’s checkered history of abuse in the Southwest”). See generally ALFREDO 
MIRANDÉ, GRINGO JUSTICE (1987) (analyzing how law, including immigration law, has 
been employed to subordinate persons of Mexican ancestry in the United States).  
 33 See, e.g., Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637–38 (3d Cir. 2006); Wang v. 
Attorney Gen., 423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1229 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Pamela A. MacLean, Immigration Judges Come Under Fire, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 
30, 2006, at 1; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010) (proposing the abolition of the Board of Immigration Appeals and 
appellate review by the court of appeals and replacing such review with appeals to a new 
Article III Court of Immigration Appeals). 
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bias against noncitizens, to simple incompetence. Such criticism 
increased after the BIA changed its procedures in 2002 to 
expedite its rulings in an attempt to reduce a large backlog of 
appeals.34 
Respected court of appeals judge Richard Posner, a 
conservative appointed to the federal bench by Republican 
President Ronald Reagan, is a vocal critic of the decisions of the 
BIA.35 As Judge Posner succinctly stated in one immigration 
appeal, “[a]t the risk of sounding like a broken record, we 
reiterate our oft-expressed concern with the adjudication of 
asylum claims by the Immigration Court and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals and with the defense of the BIA’s asylum 
decisions in this court.”36 In another opinion, he stated, “We 
understand the Board’s staggering workload. But the 
Department of Justice cannot be permitted to defeat judicial 
review by refusing to staff the Immigration Court and the Board 
of Immigration Appeals with enough judicial officers to provide 
reasoned decisions.”37 Judge Posner in still another opinion 
emphasized that 
[d]eference is earned; it is not a birthright. Repeated egregious 
failures of the Immigration Court and the Board to exercise care 
commensurate with the stakes in an asylum case can be understood, 
but not excused, as consequences of a crushing workload that the 
executive and legislative branches of the federal government have 
refused to alleviate.38 
The immigration courts also have been the subject of public 
criticism. In late 2005, The New York Times ran a front page 
story about how immigration judges, at times in mean-spirited 
and disrespectful ways, callously treated noncitizens and 
disposed of their cases.39 In response, then-Attorney General 
 
 34 See Stacy Caplow, After the Flood: The Legacy of the “Surge” of Federal 
Immigration Appeals, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1 (2012) (discussing the surge of appeals in 
the federal courts following the BIA’s streamlining measures); Jill E. Family, Beyond 
Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication 
Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541 (2011) (analyzing contemporary immigration adjudication 
problems, including the dilution of judicial review resulting from streamlining measures); 
Scott Rempell, The Board of Immigration Appeals’ Standard of Review: An Argument for 
Regulatory Reform, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 283 (2011) (studying the impacts of the reforms on 
the Board’s standard of review).  
 35 See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 534–35 (7th Cir. 2005). For analysis of Judge Posner’s 
immigration jurisprudence, see Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration 
Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1679–87 (2007). 
 36 Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 37 Mekhael v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 38 Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 39 See Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 26, 2005, at A1. 
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Alberto Gonzales formally instructed the immigration judges to 
improve their conduct.40 The Bush administration also was found 
to have employed political litmus tests in the selection of 
immigration court judges.41 
Along these lines, an empirical study of asylum 
decision-making published in 2009 has shown widely disparate 
results in the asylum decisions of immigration judges.42 The 
evidence suggests a chronic problem in the quality and 
consistency of the immigration court and BIA decisions, thereby 
placing their legitimacy in serious question. 
Concerns with immigration adjudication persist. In 2013, the 
president of the National Association of Immigration Judges 
offered one possible solution: 
Immigration courts must be restructured as real courts under Article I 
of the Constitution, similar to Tax and Bankruptcy Courts, so we can 
maintain administrative independence and ensure total transparency 
in our proceedings. This would free them from any control or influence 
by the Attorney General or Department of Homeland Security. While 
seemingly technical, this change is essential to achieve the most 
fundamental expectation we American’s [sic] hold about judges: that 
they are independent and protected from undue influence by any 
party to their proceedings. It is a reform which is much needed and 
long overdue.43 
 
 40 For discussion of the Attorney General’s memorandum, see Cham v. Attorney 
Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 686–89 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 41 The Office of the Inspector General concluded that, during the Bush 
administration, ties to the Republican Party, among other political considerations, were 
taken into consideration in the selection of immigration judges. See OFFICE OF PROF’L 
RESP. & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF 
ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 69 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/ 
special/s0807/final.pdf. 
 42 See JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, 
REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
(2009). For commentary on the study, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with 
Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2007); 
Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà vu of 
Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475 (2007); see also Kate 
Aschenbrenner, Ripples Against the Other Shore: The Impact of Trauma Exposure on the 
Immigration Process Through Adjudicators, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 53 (2013) (analyzing 
the impact of trauma suffered by immigrants on immigration adjudicators); Elizabeth 
Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the 
U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012) (examining narratives of 
“good” and “bad” immigrants that affect the exercise of discretion by immigration courts); 
Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417 (2011) 
(analyzing implicit bias that influences the decisions of immigration judges).  
 43 Dana Leigh Marks, Let Immigration Judges Be Judges, HILL (May 09, 2013, 8:03 
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/298875-let-immigration-judges-be-jud 
ges. 
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E.  The Need for More Reasonable Immigration Laws 
A system that authorizes easier migration of labor to the 
United States would likely decrease the incentive for 
circumventing the immigration laws. More liberal admissions 
grounds that allow workers and migrants who lack family 
members in the United States to lawfully enter into this nation 
would be a good first step.  
To this end, narrower inadmissibility grounds in the U.S. 
immigration laws would be more realistic than the current 
blanket exclusions that, for example, bar the immigration of poor 
and working people from the developing world.44 With relaxation 
of the inadmissibility grounds, the nation could devote scarce 
enforcement resources to efforts to bar the entry into the United 
States of criminals, terrorists, and other serious dangers to 
society. As seen in other areas of law enforcement, more focused 
immigration law enforcement has a greater likelihood of rooting 
out public safety risks than scattershot efforts that infringe on 
the civil rights of large numbers of people.45  
Moreover, more carefully crafted immigration enforcement is 
less likely to frighten immigrant communities—the very 
communities whose assistance is essential if the United States 
truly seeks to successfully combat global terrorism and crime 
generally. Unfortunately, the “war on terror” following 
September 11, 2001 has almost undoubtedly chilled Arabs and 
Muslims living in the United States from cooperating with the 
government in counter-terrorism efforts.46 
A system in which undocumented migration is reduced 
would allow for improved tracking of all noncitizens entering and 
living in the United States. It is difficult to see how the existence 
of millions of undocumented immigrants living off the grid could 
 
 44 See, e.g., Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2012) 
(providing that “[a]ny alien . . . likely at any time to become a public charge is 
inadmissible”). See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” 
MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 91–108 (2004) (analyzing history of excluding poor 
and working noncitizens from the United States). Statistics for fiscal year 2013 show that 
the public charge exclusion was a substantive ground frequently relied upon in the denial 
of immigrant visas by the State Department. See OFFICE OF VISA SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2013, at tbl.xx (2013), available at http://travel. 
state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2013AnnualReport/FY13Annual
Report-TableXX.pdf.  
 45 See Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of 
Law, 47 VILL. L. REV. 897, 912–15 (2002) (reviewing experience of U.S. Customs Service 
and its adoption of a policy limiting searches, resulting in fewer searches and increased 
rate of searches finding contraband). 
 46 See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration 
Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 295, 327–55 (2002). 
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in any way be in the national interest. Nor is there sufficient 
evidence that the U.S. government as a practical matter could 
end undocumented immigration under the current laws and 
remove all undocumented immigrants from the country. 
Consider the available evidence. Despite record levels of 
removals in the years since September 11, 2001,47 officials at the 
highest levels of the U.S. government recognize that removal of 
all undocumented immigrants from the country is simply not 
possible. In 2006, President George W. Bush himself 
acknowledged that “[m]assive deportation of the people here is 
unrealistic. It’s just not going to work.”48 President Obama has 
made similar statements.49 A 2005 study estimated that it would 
cost $41 billion a year for five years to fund a serious effort to 
remove all undocumented immigrants from the country.50 
At the same time, more liberal admissions of immigrants to 
the United States arguably would benefit the national economy. 
The Economic Reports of the President in both the Bush 
(Republican) and Obama (Democratic) administrations have 
extolled the benefits of immigrants to the U.S. economy.51 The 
Obama administration has argued that immigration reform 
would bring substantial economic benefits.52 
Some contend that incremental reform will not work and 
that bolder initiatives are necessary to cure the ills of modern 
U.S. immigration law. In that vein, the possibility of much more 
 
 47 See JOHN F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2012_1.pdf. For statistics on the 
number of unauthorized immigrants removed from the United States since 2001, see 
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2012 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 103 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/ois_yb_2012.pdf. 
 48 Elisabeth Bumiller, In Immigration Remarks, Bush Hints He Favors Senate Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2006, at A22 (emphasis added) (quoting President Bush). 
 49 See Obama Addresses the National Council of La Raza, WASH. POST (July 15, 
2008, 10:49 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/15/AR20 
08071501138_pf.html (advocating a path to legalization for undocumented 
immigrants: “we cannot and should not deport 12 million people”). 
 50 See RAJEEV GOYLE & DAVID A. JAEGER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DEPORTING THE 
UNDOCUMENTED: A COST ASSESSMENT 1–2 (2005). 
 51 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 154–56 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/erp2013/full_2013_economic_report_of_the_president.pdf; COUNCIL OF 
ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 
93 (2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode 
=ERP. 
 52 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF FIXING OUR 
BROKEN IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/report.pdf. 
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open borders has been advocated.53 In an era of an increasingly 
integrated world economy, the United States arguably requires a 
system of immigration admissions that better comports with 
social, political, and economic factors contributing to immigration 
than the current system.54 At a most fundamental level, the 
nation needs immigration laws that avoid the creation and 
re-creation of an undocumented immigrant population 
numbering in the millions.  
II. CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM 
For roughly a decade, the nation has engaged in a fractious 
national debate over reform of the immigration laws, with a 
special focus on undocumented immigration from Mexico. The 
proposals frequently call for legalization of undocumented 
immigrants, “guest” (or temporary) worker programs,55 and a 
myriad of enforcement measures. The granting of “amnesty” to 
undocumented immigrants in some of the proposals became a 
charged political accusation and contributed to political 
opposition to any reform proposal including a path to legalization 
for undocumented immigrants.56  
In December 2005, the House of Representatives passed 
what was known as the Sensenbrenner bill,57 named after its 
sponsor, Representative James Sensenbrenner. The tough nature 
of the bill sparked protests of thousands of immigrants and their 
 
 53 See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO 
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS (2007); JASON L. RILEY, LET THEM IN: THE 
CASE FOR OPEN BORDERS (2008); SATVINDER SINGH JUSS, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND 
GLOBAL JUSTICE (2006); TERESA HAYTER, OPEN BORDERS: THE CASE AGAINST 
IMMIGRATION CONTROLS (2d ed. 2004).  
 54 See Walter A. Ewing, From Denial to Acceptance: Effectively Regulating 
Immigration to the United States, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 445, 445 (2005) (“U.S. 
immigration policy is based on denial. Most lawmakers in the United States have largely 
embraced the process of economic ‘globalization,’ yet stubbornly refuse to acknowledge 
that increased migration, especially from developing nations to developed nations, is an 
integral and inevitable part of this process.”). 
 55 For critical analysis of guest worker programs, see Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest 
Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One 
Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEG. F. 219; Karla M. Campbell, Guest Worker Programs and the 
Convergence of U.S. Immigration and Development Policies: A Two-Factor Economic 
Model, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 663 (2007). Howard F. Chang, Liberal Ideals and Political 
Feasibility: Guest-Worker Programs as Second-Best Policies, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 465 (2002), provides a partial defense to guest worker programs. 
 56 See Bryn Siegel, Note, The Political Discourse of Amnesty in Immigration Policy, 
41 AKRON L. REV. 291 (2008). For a defense of amnesty, see Bill Ong Hing, The Case for 
Amnesty, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 233 (2007). 
 57 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, 
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). The Sensenbrenner bill, among other things, would have 
made the mere status of being an undocumented immigrant a felony subject to 
imprisonment and would have imposed criminal sanctions on persons who provided 
humanitarian assistance to undocumented immigrants. See id. §§ 203, 205. 
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supporters across the United States.58 Shortly thereafter, the 
Senate passed a more moderate reform proposal, which included 
legalization and guest worker programs in addition to more 
moderate enforcement measures than in the Sensenbrenner 
bill.59 Ultimately, the controversy ended in 2006 with Congress 
failing to enact immigration reform. It instead agreed only to 
authorize extension of a fence along the United States’ southern 
border with Mexico.60 Congress did so even though there is no 
evidence that this, or any other border enforcement measure 
alone, will decrease the flow of undocumented immigrants to the 
United States.61  
In the 2008 election campaign, President Obama expressed 
support for immigration reform, with a majority of Latina/o 
voters supporting him.62 His administration renewed calls for 
comprehensive immigration reform.63 In 2013, the Senate passed 
the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act (S. 744),64 which was co-sponsored by a 
bipartisan group of Senators. The bill generally has four basic 
objectives:  
(1) creating a path to citizenship for the approximately 11 million 
undocumented aliens currently living in the United States; (2) 
 
 58 For analysis of the spring 2006 immigrant rights marches, see Kevin R. 
Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a 
New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (2007); Sylvia R. Lazos 
Vargas, The Immigrant Rights Marches (Las Marchas): Did the “Gigante” (Giant) Wake 
Up or Does It Still Sleep Tonight?, 7 NEV. L.J. 780 (2007). 
 59 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 60 See Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638. For analysis of 
the political symbolism of the U.S./Mexico border fence, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 
Why a Wall?, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 147 (2012). 
 61 See JOHNSON, supra note 53, at 114–15. 
 62 See MARK HUGO LOPEZ, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE HISPANIC VOTE IN THE 2008 
ELECTION, at i–ii (2008), available at www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/98.pdf (stating 
that Latina/os voted for the Democratic presidential ticket by a 2:1 margin over the 
Republican candidates for President and Vice President). 
 63 See THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blue 
print.pdf.  
 64 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 
744, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s744pap/ 
pdf/BILLS-113s744pap.pdf. The Senate passed the bill by a margin of 68 to 32. See U.S. 
Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 1st Session, U.S. SENATE (June 27, 2013, 4:11 
PM), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress= 
113&session=1&vote=00168. For analysis of S. 744’s provisions, see NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
LAW CTR., SUMMARY & ANALYSIS: BORDER SECURITY, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND 
IMMIGRATION MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2013 (2013), available at www.nilc.org/ 
document.html?id=895; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF S. 744, THE 
BORDER SECURITY, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND IMMIGRATION MODERNIZATION ACT 
(2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44346-
Immigration.pdf; Claire Bergeron, Current Developments, Bipartisan “Gang of Eight” Bill 
Would Dramatically Alter US Immigration Law, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 431 (2013). 
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reforming America’s immigration system to better recognize 
characteristics that will help build the economy; (3) implementing an 
effective employment verification system; and (4) establishing an 
improved process for admitting future workers.65  
Despite bipartisan support, as well as a push from the White 
House, as this Article goes to press, the House of Representatives 
has not voted on the Senate bill or any alternative comprehensive 
immigration reform proposal.66  
A.  The DREAM Act 
Congress has considered many versions of a bill narrower in 
scope than the various comprehensive immigration reform 
proposals that would expressly permit states to allow 
undocumented students to pay in-state fees to attend public 
colleges and universities and to regularize their immigration 
status.67 Members of Congress almost annually sponsor 
legislation known as the Development, Relief and Education for 
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act.68  
Versions of the DREAM Act would have defined residency 
requirements for in-state tuition without regard to immigration 
 
 65 Brandon E. Davis, The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act: An Overview of the Changes Employers May Expect Following 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, FED. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2014, at 24, 26.  
 66 See Wesley Lowery, House Democrats Need 27 Signatures to Force Vote on 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/04/15/house-democrats-need-27-signatures-to-f 
orce-vote-on-comprehensive-immigration-reform-bill/; David Nakamura, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce Pushes House GOP on Immigration Reform, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/02/25/u-s-chamber-of-commer 
ce-pushes-house-gop-on-immigration-reform/. 
 67 See Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act, and Undocumented College 
Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 452–57 (2004); Thomas R. Ruge & Angela D. Iza, 
Higher Education for Undocumented Students: The Case for Open Admissions and 
In-State Tuition Rates for Students Without Lawful Immigration Status, 15 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 266–74 (2005). 
 68 See Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not “Sleeping,” Giant: The Devastating 
Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1259, 1280–82 (2008). For arguments favoring enactment of the DREAM Act, see 
Berta Hernández-Truyol & Justin Luna, Children and Immigration: International, Local, 
and Social Responsibilities, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 314–16 (2006); Victor C. Romero, 
Postsecondary School Education Benefits for Undocumented Immigrants: Promises and 
Pitfalls, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 393 (2002); Susana Garcia, Comment, Dream 
Come True or True Nightmare? The Effect of Creating Educational Opportunity for 
Undocumented Youth, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 247 (2006); Youngro Lee, Note, To 
Dream or Not to Dream: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Development, Relief, and Education 
for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231 (2006); Vicky J. 
Salinas, Comment, You Can Be Whatever You Want to Be When You Grow Up, Unless 
Your Parents Brought You to This Country Illegally: The Struggle to Grant In-State 
Tuition to Undocumented Immigrant Students, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 847 (2006); see also 
María Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented 
Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1400–04 (2005) 
(summarizing status of undocumented student access to higher education). 
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status, provided a path to legalization for eligible undocumented 
students, and made undocumented students eligible for federal 
financial aid (which they currently are not). Immigration 
restrictionists harshly criticize the many iterations of the 
DREAM Act, contending, among other things, that they reward 
unlawful conduct and amount to an “amnesty” for undocumented 
immigrants.69 
In 2007, the DREAM Act was part of a comprehensive 
Senate immigration bill that Congress ultimately failed to 
enact.70 A subsequent version of the Act, which would have 
permitted a path to legalization for undocumented high school 
graduates who attend college or serve in the military, failed in 
the U.S. Senate.71 To date, Congress has not passed any version 
of the DREAM Act.  
Although lacking authority to provide a path to legalization 
for undocumented immigrant students, some states, including 
California, have expanded access for undocumented students to 
public colleges and universities.72 In contrast, Arizona voters 
passed an initiative that barred public universities from 
providing undocumented students with any “public benefits,” 
including in-state fees, state financial aid, or enrollment in adult 
education classes.73  
 
 69 See Julia Preston, In Increments, Senate Revisits Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 3, 2007, at A1 (noting opposition to the DREAM Act in the House of Representatives 
and quoting Representative Brian P. Bilbray, who referred to the bill as “the Nightmare 
Act”). Compare Kris W. Kobach, Immigration Nullification: In-State Tuition and 
Lawmakers Who Disregard the Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 473 (2007) 
(criticizing strongly state and federal DREAM Acts), with Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers 
Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99 
(2008) (advocating passage of these laws). 
 70 See Preston, supra note 69.  
 71 See Karin Brulliard, Bill Aimed at Immigrant Children Fails, WASH. POST, Oct. 
25, 2007, at A12. 
 72 See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011) (rejecting a challenge to a California law that allows 
certain graduates of California high schools, including undocumented immigrants, to pay 
the same fees as state residents to attend the University of California, state universities, 
and community colleges). For analysis of the Martinez decision, see Kyle William Colvin, 
Note, In-State Tuition and Illegal Immigrants: An Analysis of Martinez v. Regents of the 
University of California, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 391; Beverly N. Rich, Note, Tracking AB 
540’s Potential Resilience: An Analysis of In-State Tuition for Undocumented Students in 
Light of Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. 
JUST. 297 (2010). 
 73 See Friendly House v. Napolitano, 419 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2005); Yes on Prop 
200 v. Napolitano, 160 P.3d 1216 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). Arizona Governor Jan Brewer 
later issued an order that prohibited public colleges and universities from allowing 
undocumented students granted relief by the U.S. government under the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program from eligibility for in-state university fees, or any 
public benefits. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06, 18 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 2237 (Sept. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.azsos.gov/aar/2012/36/governor.pdf. Although the executive order 
does not specifically refer to in-state tuition eligibility, Governor Brewer stated that 
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B.  Prosecutorial Discretion and Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals 
With Congress failing to pass immigration reform, the 
Obama administration took a number of steps to fine-tune its 
immigration enforcement efforts. While focusing its efforts on 
immigrants with brushes with the criminal law, it 
administratively employed its discretionary authority to make 
certain removal cases a low priority. 
One important area of deferred action involved a category of 
noncitizens who would have benefitted from passage of the 
DREAM Act. In June 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
program (DACA), an exercise of prosecutorial discretion that 
provides temporary relief from removal on a case-by-case basis to 
those who entered the United States as children.74 To be eligible 
for relief, a noncitizen must have entered the United States 
before the age of sixteen; continuously resided in the United 
States since June 15, 2007; been physically present in the United 
States and not over the age of thirty when DACA was announced; 
have not been convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, or 
multiple misdemeanors; not pose a threat to national security or 
public safety; and be currently in school, graduated from high 
school, obtained a General Educational Development (GED) 
certification, or be an honorably discharged veteran of the U.S. 
Coast Guard or Armed Forces.75 DACA recognizes its 
 
in-state tuition for DACA recipients would be unlawful under the order. See Daniel 
González, Young Migrants May Get Arizona College Tuition Break, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Sept. 
12, 2012), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/20120912young-migrants-may-get-ariz 
ona-college-tuition-break.html (“The executive order did not address tuition specifically, 
but Brewer said afterward that allowing illegal immigrants to pay in-state tuition even if 
they receive deferred action and work permits would violate state law.”).  
 74 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 
Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter DHS 
Memorandum], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecuto 
rial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. For criticism of the DACA 
program, see Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama 
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take 
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784–85, 856 (2013) (arguing that by authorizing the 
DACA program, President Obama breached his responsibility to faithfully enforce the 
immigration laws). But see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response, In Defense of DACA, 
Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 59, 62–68 (2013) 
(defending program as consistent with the executive exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
by the Executive Branch in immigration matters), available at http://www.texaslrev.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/Wadhia.pdf. 
 75 DHS Memorandum, supra note 74, at 1.  
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beneficiaries to be “low priority cases” for removal from the 
United States.76  
By the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2014, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services reported that it had 
received a total of 638,054 DACA applications, approved 521,815, 
and denied 15,968.77 In 2014, DHS announced a renewal program 
for DACA recipients.78 
DACA recipients are able to obtain employment 
authorization, a Social Security number, and, in many states, a 
driver’s license.79 However, the relatively high $465 filing fee and 
the requirement of documentation of continuous presence in the 
United States since 2007 can serve as impediments to successful 
applications,80 which may help explain why many eligible 
noncitizens have not applied for DACA relief.  
Thus far, DACA has helped more than a half million 
immigrants “who were brought to this country as children and 
know only this country as home.”81 As one commentator has 
noted, however, “it is not a permanent solution and does not 
grant [recipients] any long-term immigration status stability.”82 
III. ALTERNATIVE VISIONS  
Future possibilities for immigration reform run the gamut. 
Reform could represent incremental changes to the current 
immigration laws, with “comprehensive” immigration reform 
similar to S. 744 a possibility.83 As one commentator observed,  
 
 76 See id.  
 77 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NUMBER OF I-821D, CONSIDERATION OF 
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, INTAKE, 
BIOMETRICS AND CASE STATUS: 2012–2014 FIRST QUARTER (2014), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Imm
igration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/DACA-06-02-14.pdf. 
 78 See Secretary Johnson Announces Process for DACA Renewal, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
& IMMIGR. SERVICES (June 5, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/news/secretary-johnson-announ 
ces-process-daca-renewal. 
 79 See Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (June 13, 2014), http://www.nilc. 
org/FAQdeferredactionyouth.html.  
 80 AUDREY SINGER & NICOLE PRCHAL SVAJLENKA, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT 
BROOKINGS, IMMIGRATION FACTS: DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) 2 
(2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/08/14% 
20daca/daca_singer_svajlenka_final.pdf. 
 81 DHS Memorandum, supra note 74. 
 82 Mariela Olivares, Renewing the Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immigration 
Reform, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 79, 91 (2013). 
 83 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599 (2009); Doris Meissner, 
Keynote Address, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 309 (2007); Asa Hutchinson, Keynote 
Address, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 537–38 (2007).  
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A thoughtful and responsible reform package must accomplish a few 
things. First, it must address the dilemma of the existing 
undocumented immigrant population in our country. Second, it must 
regulate future flows of immigrants consistent with our labor market 
needs and economic interests in an increasingly inter-dependent 
world. Third, it must advance the protection of both U.S. and foreign 
workers. Finally, it must reflect the deeply engrained American value 
of fairness.84 
The author of this Article has argued that economic, moral, 
and policy arguments militate in favor of more liberal admissions 
of immigrants to the United States than that provided by current 
law.85 A related possibility is the greater economic integration, 
including the integration of labor markets, of the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico modeled after the relatively successful 
European Union.  
A.  A North American Union? Increased Economic Integration of 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
At the tail end of the twentieth century, regional common 
markets gained popularity. Many nations perceived the economic 
benefits of more integrated economies. At the same time, there 
was reluctance to move from a restricted to a more open scheme 
immediately. In several important instances, including the 
European Union, labor migration between the member nations 
evolved out of increased trade of goods and services. 
The U.S. government at some point may consider 
regularizing the flow of labor from Mexico into the United 
States.86 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
might be expanded to permit labor migration that mirrors the 
free trade of goods and services among the member nations. A 
North American Union modeled on the European Union could 
 
 84 Muzaffar Chishti, A Redesigned Immigration Selection System, 41 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 115, 116 (2008); see Johnson, supra note 83. 
 85 See JOHNSON, supra note 53. 
 86 Considerable attention has been paid to the growing economic integration of 
North America. See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION: BEYOND 
NAFTA (Peter Hakim & Robert E. Litan eds., 2002); ERIC HELLEINER, TOWARDS NORTH 
AMERICAN MONETARY UNION? THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF CANADA’S EXCHANGE RATE 
REGIME (2006); Emily Gilbert, Money, Citizenship, Territoriality and the Proposals for 
North American Monetary Union, 26 POL. GEOGRAPHY 141 (2007); Emily Gilbert, The 
Inevitability of Integration? Neoliberal Discourse and the Proposals for a New North 
American Economic Space After September 11, 95 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 202 
(2005); Axel Huelsemeyer, Toward Deeper North American Integration: A Customs 
Union?, CANADIAN-AM. PUB. POL’Y, Oct. 2004, at 2. Of course, opposition to any such 
union is strong. See, e.g., JEROME R. CORSI, THE LATE GREAT USA: THE COMING MERGER 
WITH MEXICO AND CANADA (2007); COLIN D. STANDISH & RUSSELL R. STANDISH, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, THE NORTH AMERICAN UNION, THE PAPACY, & GLOBALISM (2007). 
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permit labor migration among Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States.87 
Some preliminary steps might be necessary before the 
implementation of a North American regional migration 
arrangement. Noting that the European Union invested billions 
of dollars in the infrastructure of new member nations, one 
observer argues that the United States must consider an 
economic adjustment strategy for Mexico to decrease migration 
pressures and allow for the possibility of more manageable free 
labor movement into the United States.88  
B.  Integration of Immigrants into Civil Society 
Discussion of immigration reform often neglects the 
consideration of strategies that might improve the integration of 
legal, as well as undocumented, immigrants into U.S. society.89 
Facilitating naturalization of immigrants is one way to provide 
for the legal integration of immigrants. The U.S. government, 
however, has been somewhat inconsistent with respect to 
promoting naturalization as well as other programs, such as 
ensuring access to federal public benefits programs, which might 
facilitate immigrant integration.90  
Although often focusing on strategies to facilitate 
immigration enforcement, state and local governments can play 
an important role in the integration of immigrants into civil 
 
 87 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Legal Immigration Reform: Toward Rationality and 
Equity, in BLUEPRINTS FOR AN IDEAL LEGAL IMMIGRATION POLICY 5, 5–6 (Richard D. 
Lamm & Alan Simpson eds., 2001); Noemi Gal-Or, Labor Mobility Under 
NAFTA: Regulatory Policy Spearheading the Social Supplement to the International 
Trade Regime, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 365 (1998); Emily Gibbs, Comment, Free 
Movement of Labor in North America: Using the European Union as a Model for the 
Creation of North American Citizenship, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 265, 286–88 (2010); see also 
Ernesto Hernández-López, Sovereignty Migrates in U.S. and Mexican Law: Transnational 
Influences in Plenary Power and Non-intervention, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1345 (2007) 
(noting that the United States and Mexico have been acting in increasingly transnational 
ways with respect to migration); Katie E. Chachere, Comment, Keeping America 
Competitive: A Multilateral Approach to Illegal Immigration Reform, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 
659 (2008) (contending that United States must work with other nations on immigration). 
See generally BILL ONG HING, ETHICAL BORDERS: NAFTA, GLOBALIZATION, AND MEXICAN 
MIGRATION (2010) (analyzing immigration in North America after NAFTA); L. RONALD 
SCHEMAN, GREATER AMERICA: A NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR THE AMERICAS IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2003) (advocating generally greater cooperation between nations 
in the Americas); THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION: BEYOND NAFTA, supra 
note 86 (analyzing integration of North America). 
 88 See Timothy A. Canova, Closing the Border and Opening the Door: Mobility, 
Adjustment, and the Sequencing of Reform, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341 (2007). 
 89 See, e.g., SECURING THE FUTURE: U.S. IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY: A READER 
(Michael Fix ed., 2007).  
 90 See Judith Bernstein-Baker, Citizenship in a Restrictionist Era: The Mixed 
Messages of Federal Policies, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 367, 381–84 (2007). 
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society.91 Issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants 
or recipients of deferred action, which has proven to be hotly 
contested in the states,92 is one strategy that would facilitate 
noncitizen integration. A number of states have passed laws 
allowing undocumented high school graduates to pay in-state 
fees at public universities.93 Providing additional 
English-as-a-second-language classes, which are chronically 
over-enrolled,94 and bilingual education95 also would facilitate 
English language acquisition by immigrants and thus immigrant 
integration.  
CONCLUSION 
Congress will pass immigration reform. The only questions 
are when and what form it will take. The answer to both 
questions is far from clear at this time. This Article outlines some 
of the possible reforms that Congress might consider in the 
future. 
 
 91 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 581–609 (2008). 
 92 See Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The 
Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213 (2004); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Missouri, the 
“War on Terrorism,” and Immigrants: Legal Challenges Post 9/11, 67 MO. L. REV. 775, 
798–807 (2002); María Pabón López, More than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on 
the Use of Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91 (2004); Joelle P. Hong, 
Current Developments, Illinois Joins Three States in Granting Driving Privileges to 
Undocumented Immigrants, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 713 (2012); Kari E. D’Ottavio, 
Comment, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Why Granting Driver’s Licenses to 
DACA Beneficiaries Makes Constitutional and Political Sense, 72 MD. L. REV. 931 (2013); 
Steven J. Escobar, Note, Allowing Undocumented Immigrants to Obtain Driver’s Licenses 
in New Mexico: Revising, Not Abandoning, the System, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 285 
(2013). 
 93 See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011) (upholding California law permitting California high school 
graduates including undocumented immigrants to pay in-state fees at public universities); 
see Rodríguez, supra note 91, at 605–09; Olivas, supra note 67. 
 94 See James Thomas Tucker, The ESL Logjam: Waiting Times for ESL Classes and 
the Impact on English Learners, 96 NAT’L CIVIC REV., Spring 2007, at 30. Increasingly, 
the private sector has promoted immigrant assimilation with employers through, among 
other policies, promoting English language acquisition. See Pamela Constable & N.C. 
Aizenman, Companies Take Lead in Assimilation Efforts, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2008, at 
B1. 
 95 See Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martínez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of 
Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227 (2000) 
(analyzing elimination of bilingual education in California).  
